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	<title>Comments on: Sacred Cows and the New Pay-TV Marketplace</title>
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		<title>By: Steve Christian</title>
		<link>http://paytvblog.verimatrix.com/2009/10/sacred-cows-and-the-new-pay-tv-marketplace/comment-page-1/#comment-146</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve Christian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 20:34:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think I would restate my view (and a central theme of the Farncombe paper that I was commenting on) that CSA has been and remains a valuable algorithm for revenue protection in traditional broadcast networks. But its central tenet of HW only implementation does not seem nearly as valuable in the new breed of networks that are IP oriented and fundamentally targeted at multiple device types. 

So is it reasonable to continue to mandate this standard - and only this standard - as the landscape changes so dramatically? AES, as an example, is one family of alternate cryptographic algorithms that has proven to be equally robust and is at least as widely supported - in both SW and HW implementations.

We are also very keen supporters of Simulcrypt for many reasons, not least the one you state, but - to link this thought to your comment - AES and other scrambling algorithms can equally well be used at the core a practical Simulcrypt system deployment without compromise to the integrity of content security.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think I would restate my view (and a central theme of the Farncombe paper that I was commenting on) that CSA has been and remains a valuable algorithm for revenue protection in traditional broadcast networks. But its central tenet of HW only implementation does not seem nearly as valuable in the new breed of networks that are IP oriented and fundamentally targeted at multiple device types. </p>
<p>So is it reasonable to continue to mandate this standard &#8211; and only this standard &#8211; as the landscape changes so dramatically? AES, as an example, is one family of alternate cryptographic algorithms that has proven to be equally robust and is at least as widely supported &#8211; in both SW and HW implementations.</p>
<p>We are also very keen supporters of Simulcrypt for many reasons, not least the one you state, but &#8211; to link this thought to your comment &#8211; AES and other scrambling algorithms can equally well be used at the core a practical Simulcrypt system deployment without compromise to the integrity of content security.</p>
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		<title>By: Marnix Vlot</title>
		<link>http://paytvblog.verimatrix.com/2009/10/sacred-cows-and-the-new-pay-tv-marketplace/comment-page-1/#comment-145</link>
		<dc:creator>Marnix Vlot</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 01:12:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The threat from the single point of attack is very real, and burying the control word secrets deep in silicon in the end will not be enough; the control word protection schemes have other weaknesses. 

However, the merrits of CSA are serious and should not be forgotten. Broad technology proliferation is very important and simulcrypt plays a crucial role in some markets to encourage competition. Interchangeability of CA systems has been proven to be very important. Those should not be called sacred cows per se.

Finally: all this has to be viewed in the light of the worst possible attack ever: (online) content redistribution. Which floodgate is bigger?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The threat from the single point of attack is very real, and burying the control word secrets deep in silicon in the end will not be enough; the control word protection schemes have other weaknesses. </p>
<p>However, the merrits of CSA are serious and should not be forgotten. Broad technology proliferation is very important and simulcrypt plays a crucial role in some markets to encourage competition. Interchangeability of CA systems has been proven to be very important. Those should not be called sacred cows per se.</p>
<p>Finally: all this has to be viewed in the light of the worst possible attack ever: (online) content redistribution. Which floodgate is bigger?</p>
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